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Abstract 
 
This study uses hazard function estimations and time-series and cross-sectional growth 
regressions to examine the impact of exit through merger and acquisition (M&A) or failure, 
and internally-generated growth, on the firm-size distribution within the US credit union 
sector. Consolidation through M&A was the principal cause of a reduction in the number of 
credit unions, but impact on concentration was small. Divergence between the average 
internally-generated growth of smaller and larger credit unions was the principal driver of the 
rise in concentration.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In banking and financial services, industry structure characterized by the firm-size 
distribution is a key determinant of the nature of competition. Competition among financial 
services providers has, in turn, implications for consumer welfare, and for the stability or 
fragility of the financial system. In the US credit union sector, as in banking and financial 
services generally, a tendency for concentration to increase was apparent in many developed 
countries throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.1  
This study examines the contribution of exit and the internally-generated growth of 
established firms to changes in industry structure and the rise in concentration in the US 
credit union sector. Changes to the membership of the population of firms through exit occurs 
as a result of corporate failure, or a merger and acquisition (M&A) transaction in which an 
established firm is acquired by another industry member. Variation between firms in patterns 
of internally-generated growth leaves the population membership unchanged, but alters the 
relative shares of firms in total industry assets. If firm-level growth rates are correlated with 
firm size, the link between internally-generated growth and concentration is self-evident. 
According to Gibrat’s Law (Gibrat, 1931), also known as the Law of Proportionate Effect, 
even if growth and size are uncorrelated, and the factors that influence the firm’s growth such 
as customer demand, managerial talent, innovation or organisational structure, are randomly 
distributed across firms, there is a natural tendency for concentration to increase over time 
and for the firm size distribution to become increasingly skewed.2  
Structural and conduct deregulation, technological and financial innovation, and 
changes in the economic environment, enabled many US credit unions to expand their scale 
of operations significantly during the 1990s and 2000s. In 2010 credit unions accounted for 
around 10% of consumer savings and deposits in the US, and provided financial services to 
more than 90 million members.3 In common with commercial banking, the credit union 
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sector has undergone large-scale consolidation.4 The number of credit unions declined from 
14,549 in 1990 to 7,334 in 2010. A few new credit unions were formed, while many more 
disappeared through either acquisition or failure. At the end of 2010, 167 US credit unions 
reported assets in excess of $1bn and loan portfolios similar in structure to that of a medium-
sized commercial bank.5  
This study provides an integrated analysis of corporate demographics for the US 
credit union sector for the period 1994-2010. There are several important insights with 
respect to the drivers of acquisition and failure. Smaller credit unions are at higher risk of 
acquisition or failure than their larger counterparts. Older credit unions that are similar in size 
to younger credit unions are more likely to be acquired, but the failure probability is not age-
dependent. Credit unions holding a high proportion of liquid assets, those with low loans-to-
assets ratios, and those with low profitability, are at increased risk of exit through acquisition 
or failure. Highly capitalized credit unions are at increased risk of acquisition.  
This study also provides insights into the evolution of industry structure for the US 
credit union sector. Consolidation through M&A has greatly reduced the population size, but 
the impact on concentration has been modest, owing to the relatively small average asset size 
of acquired credit unions. Internally-generated growth is shown to be the main driver of the 
trend towards increased concentration. Interpreted as a descriptor of the dynamics of the size-
growth relationship for each credit union individually, Gibrat’s Law accurately describes the 
growth of credit unions at the upper end of the asset size distribution; but for many of the 
smaller credit unions Gibrat’s Law is rejected in favour of a stationary alternative hypothesis. 
Interpreted as a descriptor of the cross-sectional size-growth relationship Gibrat’s Law is 
unequivocally rejected, with larger credit unions consistently experiencing faster average 
growth than their smaller counterparts. This divergence between the average growth of large 
and small credit unions is the principal cause of the increase in concentration.  
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In the previous literature on credit union failure, Smith and Woodbury’s (2010) 
comparative study of US banks and credit unions suggests credit unions are less exposed than 
banks to fluctuations in the business cycle. Elsewhere, it has been shown that small or weakly 
capitalized credit unions are among those most at risk of failure. Other factors that increase 
the failure hazard include poorly trained management, lax lending standards and weak 
collection operations, poor record-keeping, and the closure of sponsoring companies 
(Kharadia and Collins, 1981; Gordon, 1987; US Government Accountability Office, 1991; 
Barron et al., 1994; Pille and Paradi, 2002; Wilcox, 2005). In respect of credit union M&A, 
Goddard et al. (2009) find the hazard of acquisition for US credit unions during the period 
2001-06 is inversely related to asset size and profitability, and positively related to liquidity. 
Worthington (2004) finds asset size, asset management, liquidity and regulatory variables 
influenced significantly the probability of Australian credit unions engaging in M&A during 
the period 1992-95.6 
Barron et al. (1994) investigate the growth of state-chartered credit unions in New 
York City for the period 1914-90, by analyzing the effects of organizational age, size, and 
population density on the rates of failure and growth. Old and small institutions were more 
likely to fail, while young and small institutions had the highest growth rates. Goddard et al. 
(2002) test Gibrat’s Law for US credit unions, using data for the period 1990-99. Larger 
credit unions grew faster than smaller ones. On average, credit unions with above-average 
growth in one period experienced below-average growth in the following period. Small credit 
unions exhibited more variable growth than large credit unions. More recently, Wheelock and 
Wilson (2011) report evidence of increasing returns to scale among US credit unions of all 
sizes for the period 1989-2006. They anticipate that continued deregulation, allowing credit 
unions to expand their scale or scope of financial service provision, would encourage further 
growth at the upper end of the size distribution. 
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The econometric analysis reported in this study comprises a panel estimation of 
hazard functions for the determinants of acquisition or failure, and two sets of time-series and 
cross-sectional estimations of the relationship between asset size and internally-generated 
growth. This study extends and integrates previous empirical analysis of credit union 
acquisition (Goddard et al., 2009), and the dynamics of credit union growth (Goddard et al., 
2002). The Goddard et al. (2009) study of disappearance through acquisition is extended by 
estimating a competing-risks model that comprises separate hazard functions for the 
incidence of firm disappearance through both acquisition and failure. The implications of 
population changes through acquisition and failure for the long-term trend in concentration 
are also explored.  
The present analysis of growth also offers several improvements on the cross-
sectional and panel analysis of credit union growth during the 1990s reported by Goddard et 
al. (2002). In order to focus exclusively on internally-generated growth (as opposed to growth 
by means of acquisition) in the cross-sectional analysis, the lagged size and lagged growth 
covariates of any credit union that was an acquirer are adjusted by defining the lagged values 
for a ‘synthetic’ credit union constructed using the aggregate assets of the acquirer and the 
acquired credit union as separate entities at the relevant data-points. Survivorship bias in the 
cross-sectional growth regressions is addressed by correcting for violation of the conditions 
for valid estimation and inference resulting from statistical dependence between growth and 
survival. The Heckman sample-selection model provides a framework for integrating the 
analyses of growth, and disappearance through acquisition or failure. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the US credit union sector. 
Section III reports an empirical analysis of the determinants of exit through acquisition or 
failure. Section IV reports an empirical analysis of patterns of survivorship and internally-
generated growth. Finally, Section V summarizes and concludes.  
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II. THE US CREDIT UNION SECTOR 
The US credit union data are compiled from the ‘5300 Call Reports’, published by the 
National Credit Union Association (NCUA). Semi-annual data are available for the period 
June 1994 to December 2010. These data are augmented with information (provided by the 
NCUA in response to several Freedom of Information requests) on entrants and exits. 
Attrition is tracked to an exceptional degree of accuracy, with a cause of disappearance 
identified for 99.5% of all exits. The acquiring credit union is identified for 98.8% of credit 
unions that exited as a result of M&A, and acquisitions account for 89.9% of all exits.  
Table 1 (panel A) reports the total number of US credit unions at the end of December 
from 1994 to 2010, and an analysis of the evolution of the distribution of the population by 
asset size. In each year, the population is subdivided into five asset size classes, defined in 
real terms as follows: class 1, assets below $2m in 1994 prices (all price conversions are 
based on the US GDP deflator); class 2, assets between $2m and $6m; class 3, $6m to $18m; 
class 4, $18m to $54m; class 5, assets above $54m. This analysis indicates that there has been 
a marked shift in the composition of the population by asset size, owing to a combination of 
consolidation through acquisition and failure, and differences between the average internally-
generated growth of small and large credit unions. In 1994, for example, class 1 accounted 
for 31.6% of the entire population, and class 5 accounted for 9.0%. In 2010, the 
corresponding figures were 16.6% for class 1 (assets below $2.8m in current prices) and 
22.6% for class 5 (assets above $74.9m in current prices). 
The shift in the asset size distribution has been encouraged by several developments 
in regulation and fiscal treatment, which have contributed to a tendency for the larger credit 
unions to offer portfolios of financial services resembling those of medium-sized commercial 
banks.7 The NCUA revised the field of membership rules in 1994, diluting the common bond 
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and permitting credit unions to add occupational groups of up to 100 persons without 
regulatory approval. The 1998 Credit Union Membership Access Act (CUMAA) permitted 
federal credit unions to add select employee groups (SEGs) to their fields of membership. In 
some cases a credit union’s common-bond designation makes it difficult to add SEGs, and 
some credit unions converted from occupational to residential common bonds in order to 
expand their membership base.8 
Owing partly to the restrictions on their activities and their high capitalization, credit 
unions have, in general, withstood the current financial crisis better than many banks (Smith 
and Woodbury, 2010). The crisis in the real-estate market has impacted on the credit union 
sector, primarily through the investment policies of a number of corporate credit unions,9 
which used cash deposits received from retail credit unions to purchase risky asset-backed 
securities, and realized large losses in several cases. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act made radical 
changes to financial services regulation and supervision. For credit unions, deposit insurance 
was increased from $100,000 to $250,000 per account, and the supervision of corporate credit 
unions was strengthened.10  
Table 2 reports a further analysis of the dynamics of change in the asset size 
distribution, in the form of a set of empirical yearly rates of transition between each size class 
and the nearest adjacent classes, and exit rates from each size class. The size classes are the 
same as those used to construct Table 1, and the computations follow closely the 
methodology used by Robertson (2001) in a similar analysis of transition rates between asset 
size classes for US banks over the period 1960-2000. The numbers of credit unions moving 
by more than one size class in any year are negligible, and the corresponding rates of 
transition are not reported. Table 2 indicates that there is a high degree of stability in the asset 
size distribution from year to year. The propensities for credit unions to remain within the 
same asset size class are, in general, higher on average than those reported by Robertson 
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(2001) for banks, particularly among the larger size classes.11 The propensity to remain 
within the same class is an increasing function of size, and this relationship appears to be 
driven mainly by an inverse relationship between size and the propensity to exit. The exit rate 
in the two largest size classes appears to have risen significantly over the observation period. 
The year 2008-09 witnessed unusually high rates of upward transition from each of classes 1 
to 4 to the next highest class (2 to 5, respectively), apparently due to unusual patterns of 
consolidation at the height of the late-2000s financial crisis.   
Consistent with the analysis presented by Robertson (2001), Table 1 (panel B) reports 
projections of future changes in the asset size distribution over the period 2011-15, based on 
the assumption that the yearly entry, transition and exit rates observed over the final year 
included in Table 2, 2009-10, remain unchanged for the following five years. The projected 
size distribution for 2011 is obtained by multiplying a matrix containing the transition and 
exit rates for each size class by a vector containing the numbers of credit unions in each class 
in 2010, and adding five new entrants to class 1 (equivalent to the actual number of entrants 
in 2010, all of which joined class 1). The projections for subsequent years are then obtained 
iteratively, by multiplying the same matrix by a vector containing the projected numbers for 
the preceding year. The projections suggest further shrinkage in the population and shifts in 
the shape of the size distribution, with the projected number of credit unions in the smallest 
size class dropping by a further 23.4% over a five-year period, while the projected number in 
the largest size class drops by only 2.2%. 
Table 3 reports an analysis of changes in the population owing to entry and exit. 
Between December 1994 and December 2010, the total number of credit unions fell from 
12,051 to 7,334. This decline in numbers reflects the net effect of entry (156 new credit 
unions) and exit (4,873 credit unions). A large majority of the credit unions that exited did so 
as a consequence of having been acquired (4,382 credit unions, or 89.9% of the total number 
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that exited). The exit rate was remarkably stable throughout the 2000s (between 3% and 4% 
per year), and the exit rate does not appear to be sensitive to the economic cycle. Smith 
(2012) reports that on conservative estimates, credit union loan portfolios were around 25% 
less sensitive to macroeconomic shocks than bank loan portfolios.   
 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EXIT THROUGH ACQUISITION OR FAILURE 
Section III reports an investigation of the determinants of credit union disappearance 
through acquisition or failure during the period 1994-2010.  
 
Empirical Model for the Determinants of Acquisition or Failure.  
The hazard function estimations reported in this section are based on the method used 
by Wheelock and Wilson (2000) to model the hazards of failure and acquisition for US 
banks. The empirical model is the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model with time-varying 
covariates. The probabilities of disappearance through events defined as failure and 
acquisition are modelled separately, using a competing-risks framework. The alternative 
modes of disappearance are treated as independent events, and the observations on a credit 
union that disappeared through each event are treated as right-censored in the estimations of 
the hazard for disappearance through the other event.  
The hazard function expressing the probability that credit union i disappears through 
event k between time t and time t+1 (k=1 denotes acquisition; k=2 denotes failure), 
conditional on a vector of covariates specific to credit union i at time t that influence the 
probability of event k, denoted xk,i(t), is modelled as follows:  
k,i(t | xk,i(t), k) = )t(k exp(xk,i(t)'k)        [1] 
In [1], the baseline hazard is denoted )t(k , and k is a vector of coefficients to be 
estimated. The time-index t is measured in calendar time elapsed since December 1994. Rt 
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denotes the set of credit unions that are in existence at time t and exposed to risk of 
disappearance between t and t+1, and Dk,t denotes the set of dk,t credit unions that disappear 
through event k between time t and time t+1. The contribution to the partial likelihood 
function of credit union i, which disappears through event k between t and t+1, is: 
 
 tRj
kj,kki,k ))'t(xexp(/))'t(xexp(         [2] 
The baseline hazard )t(k  drops out of the partial likelihood function, and is not 
parameterized explicitly. The (semi-parametric) log-partial likelihood function is: 
ln[L(k)] =    
  
T
1t Di Rj
kj,kt,kki,k
t,k t
)}])'t(xexp(ln{d)'t(x[      [3] 
The hazard function covariate definitions are as follows: Si,t = Total Assets; Ki,t = capital-to-
assets ratio = Net Worth /Total Assets; Qi,t = Liquid Assets / Total Assets; Ni,t = Non-
performing Loans / Total Assets; Li,t = Loans / Total Assets; Ei,t = Non-interest Expenses / 
Total Assets; Ri,t = Return on Assets; and Ai,t = Age. Table 4 reports the mean values of each 
of the covariates at the end of each year. In the empirical hazard functions, logarithmic 
transformations are applied to the total assets and age covariates.  
 
Estimation Results.  
Table 5 reports the empirical hazard function estimation results. All members of the 
credit union population are included in the estimations (see the final column of Table 1). The 
acquisition hazard function is based on 4,471 credit unions reported in Table 3 as exits 
through either acquisition or purchase and assumption. The failure hazard function is based 
on 341 credit unions reported in Table 3 as exits through liquidation. Observations on credit 
unions that exited for reasons other than acquisition, purchase and assumption or liquidation 
are treated as right-censored.  
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The anticipated inverse relationship between asset size and the hazard of 
disappearance is evident in both of the hazard function estimations, indicating that a smaller 
credit union was at significantly greater risk of disappearance through either acquisition or 
failure than a larger one. The coefficient on the age covariate in the M&A hazard is positive 
and significant, suggesting that an older credit union is more likely to be acquired than a 
younger credit union of the same size. The coefficient on the age covariate is insignificant in 
the failure hazard. 
 The coefficients on the capital-to-assets ratio covariate are negative and significant in 
the M&A hazard, and positive and significant in the failure hazard. These results are 
consistent with Hannan and Piloff’s (2009) explanation for a negative relationship between 
the capitalization of US banks and the hazard of acquisition: high capitalization is a proxy for 
efficiency, indicating limited scope for post-merger efficiency gains, while low capitalization 
reduces the purchase price and increases the attractiveness of the target. Contrary to results 
reported by Wilcox (2005), highly capitalized credit unions appear to be at greater risk of 
failure. Credit unions regarded as inadequately capitalized under Section 301 of CUMAA 
(1998) are subject to a range of mandatory actions, such as earnings retentions, lending 
restrictions and the prohibition of increases in assets.12 These actions impact on both the 
denominator and the numerator of the capital-to-assets ratio, sometimes causing the latter to 
spike for a distressed credit union immediately prior to failure. It is also the case that smaller 
credit unions maintain a higher capital-to-assets ratio on average than large credit unions, and 
small credit unions are at higher risk of failure. Although x2,i(t) includes a separate control for 
asset size, it is possible that the positive coefficient on Ki,t in the failure hazard also reflects 
aspects of the strong association between asset size and failure.    
The coefficients on the liquidity ratio covariate are positive and significant in both 
hazards. The coefficient on the loans-to-assets ratio covariate is insignificant in the M&A 
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hazard, but the corresponding coefficient is negative and significant in the failure hazard. A 
credit union that hordes cash, or does not create a loans portfolio of a size commensurate with 
its deposits, may be either an attractive target for an acquirer that believes itself capable of 
earning a higher return by expanding the loans portfolio, or at risk of failure due to an 
inability to generate an adequate return.  
The coefficient on the non-performing loans covariate in the M&A hazard is negative 
and significant, while the corresponding coefficient in the failure hazard is positive and 
significant. These coefficients suggest a lack of control over the quality of lending makes a 
credit union a less attractive target for acquisition, but increases the likelihood of 
disappearance through failure. The coefficient on the ratio of non-interest expenses to assets 
covariate in the M&A hazard is positive and significant. This appears consistent with the 
interpretation of the ratio of non-interest expenses to assets as a managerial inefficiency 
measure, and the hypothesis that inefficient credit unions are more vulnerable to either 
acquisition. The corresponding coefficient in the failure hazard is insignificant. Finally, the 
coefficients on the return on assets covariate are negative and significant in both hazards, 
indicating that the likelihood of disappearance through either acquisition or failure is reduced 
by an increase in profitability.    
 
Impact of Consolidation on Industry Structure.  
Table 6 reports a descriptive analysis of the trend in concentration over the period 
1994-2010. The first five columns report five-, ten- and twenty-firm concentration ratios, 
together with the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) and the HHI Numbers Equivalent. 
Consistent with the patterns reported in Table 1, these data indicate a trend towards increased 
concentration that has been remarkably steady and consistent over time.  
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The final two columns of Table 6 provide an indication of the contribution of 
consolidation through M&A to the trend in concentration, in the form of a ‘counterfactual’ 
HHI based on hypothetical population data. For the purposes of calculating the counterfactual 
HHI, each acquired credit union is assumed to have continued to operate as a separate entity 
to the end of 2010. A proportion of the combined assets of the acquirer at each data-point 
after the merger took place is reallocated to the (counterfactually surviving) acquired credit 
union. The proportion of the assets reallocated is based on the relative asset sizes of the 
acquirer and the acquired at the data point immediately preceding the merger: the final data 
point at which separate assets data are available for both institutions.  
The large number of credit union mergers notwithstanding, the analysis reported in 
Table 6 suggests that the contribution of M&A to the rise in concentration was modest. The 
counterfactual 2010 HHI of 43.8 is only slightly smaller than the observed HHI of 46.5; and 
the observed drop in the HHI Numbers Equivalent from 520.9 in 1994 to 215.2 in 2010 
would have been mitigated only marginally, to a counterfactual figure of 228.5 in 2010, had 
no credit unions mergers taken place between 1994 and 2010. The disparity between the large 
effect of M&A on the population size, and the much smaller effect on concentration, is 
attributed to the majority of acquired credit unions having been drawn from the lower end of 
the asset size distribution.  
 
IV EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNALLY-GENERATED GROWTH 
  The empirical analysis reported in Section III suggests that while consolidation 
through M&A accounts for most of the large decline in the number of US credit unions over 
the period 1994-2010, the effect on industry structure was relatively small. With the sector 
also having experienced modest rates of entry and failure, it appears that internally-generated 
growth was the main driver of the trend towards increased concentration over the same 
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period. Section IV reports an empirical analysis of the relationship between credit union size 
and growth, using Gibrat’s Law as a benchmark. 
 
Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between Firm Size and Growth.  
  The empirical analysis of the firm size-growth relationship is based on the following 
general model specification: 
t,it,i,3
m
1j
1jt,ijt,it,i,j,21t,it,i,1t,i,01t,it,i ut)ss(s)ss(
t,i
 

     [4] 
In [4], logarithmic growth over a one-year period is the dependent variable, and log size at 
the start of the period and growth over mi,t previous one-year periods are the explanatory 
variables.  
Clearly, estimation requires the imposition of restrictions on the coefficients of [4]. 
Below, two sets of restrictions are considered. Under the first set, it is assumed that the 
coefficients are constant over time, but variable over all surviving i for which a complete set 
of time-series observations is available, so that i,1t,i,1   for all t (with similar restrictions 
imposed on the other coefficients, and mi,t=mi). These restrictions are embodied in a set of 
individual Dickey-Fuller time-series regressions (for each i=1,...,N, where N is the number of 
surviving credit unions), defined as follows: 
t,ii,3
m
1j
1jt,ijt,ii,j,21t,ii,1i,01t,it,i ut)ss(s)ss(
i
 

     [5] 
Each regression in [5] has t=1,...,T observations. The focus is on the dynamics of the size-
growth relationship for each credit union individually. As the credit union grows in size 
(possibly relative to a deterministic time-trend or drift component), either growth might tend 
to decline (1,i<0), or growth might be independent of attained size (1,i=0).13 The latter case 
1,i=0 represents Gibrat’s Law, interpreted as a descriptor of the dynamics of the size-growth 
relationship for each credit union individually. 
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Under the second set of restrictions, it is assumed that the coefficients are the same for 
all i but variable over time, so that t,1t,i,1   for all i (with similar restrictions imposed on 
the other coefficients, and mi,t=1 for all i,t). A series of cross-sectional regressions (for each 
t=1,...,T) is defined as follows: 
t,i2t,i1t,it,21t,it,1t,01t,it,i u)ss(s)ss(         [6] 
Each regression in [6] has i=1,...,Nt observations (where Nt is the number of credit unions live 
in year t). The focus is on the cross-sectional size-growth relationship, which might be either 
positive (1,t>0), neutral (1,t=0) or negative (1,t<0). The nature of this relationship is 
permitted to vary over time. The case 1,t=0 represents Gibrat’s Law, interpreted as a 
descriptor of the cross-sectional size-growth relationship. 
In order to focus solely on growth that is internally generated, rather than growth that 
is achieved by means of M&A, the lagged size and lagged growth covariates in [6] of any 
credit union that was an acquirer are adjusted by defining the lagged values for a ‘synthetic’ 
credit union constructed using the aggregate assets of the acquirer and the acquired credit 
union as separate entities at the relevant data-points.14 The cross-sectional size-growth 
regressions are estimated using the Heckman (1979) sample-selection model, to mitigate 
potential survivorship bias.15 The latter might arise because the probability that a credit union 
survives, and therefore appears in the data set for the estimation of the growth regression, 
might be related to the credit union’s propensity for growth. The direction of any association 
between growth and survival might be either positive or negative: on the one hand, reckless 
growth in lending might increase the risk of disappearance as a consequence of financial 
distress; but on the other hand, sluggish growth in lending might reflect operational 
inefficiency or underperforming management. The sample-selection model comprises [6], 
and the following survivorship regression observed for all credit unions live at t–1:   
)ss(sz 2t,i1t,it,21t,it,1t,0
*
t,i   + 3,t'xi,t–1 
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zi,t = 1 if 0z t,i
*
t,i  ;  zi,t = 0 if 0z t,i
*
t,i       [7] 
where 3,t is a vector of coefficients, and xi,t–1 = (si,t–1  si,t–1–si,t–2  Ki,t–1 Qi,t–1 Li,t–1 Ni,t–1 Ei,t–1 
Ri,t–1). See section III for covariate definitions. Equation [6] is observed only for those credit 
unions that were live at t–1 and survived to t, for which zi,t = 1 in [7]. The disturbances ui,t in 
[6] and i,t in [7] are assumed to be bivariate normal, with 1)var( t,i  , 
2
t,ut,i )uvar(  , 
t,ut,it,i )u,(corr  . The covariates that appear in the survivorship regression are the same 
as those in the acquisition and failure hazard functions reported in section 2, with the sole 
exception of the age covariate, which was generally insignificant in preliminary estimations 
of the sample-selection model. 
 
Estimation Results: Time-Series Regressions 
 Table 7 reports summary results from Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests 
on the log assets series (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), together with the associated Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (2003) (IPS) panel unit root tests, based on estimations of [5] for each of the 7,247 
surviving credit unions that reported assets data in every December call report from 1994 to 
2010 (inclusive). The summary results for the ADF tests are the proportions of rejections of 
the unit root null hypothesis (1,i=0 in [5]) in favour of the stationarity alternative (1,i<0) at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 significance levels. These proportions are reported for the full cohort of 
7,247 surviving credit unions, and for the same cohort subdivided by rank based on 
December 1994 assets as follows: size band (i) comprises rank 1-250; (ii) 251-500; (iii) 500-
1000; (iv) 1001-2000; (v) 2001-7247 (rank 1 denotes the largest credit union in December 
1994). Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used to determine mi, the lag-length for the 
first-difference terms in log assets on the right-hand-side of [5], for each credit union 
individually. The IPS procedure tests the null hypothesis of a unit root for all panel 
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constituents (1,i=0 for all i in [5]) against the alternative of stationarity for one or more panel 
constituents (1,i<0 for some i).  
 According to Table 7, the proportions of rejections of the unit root null hypothesis in 
the ADF tests are higher than the proportions that should be expected due to Type 1 error 
(equivalent to the significance level) if the null hypothesis were true in every case. For 
example, the proportion of rejections at the 0.05 level for the entire cohort of surviving credit 
unions is 0.153. The IPS test rejects decisively the null hypothesis of a unit root for every 
credit union, with a p-value of 0.000. Across size bands (i)-(v), however, there is some 
variation in this pattern. At the 0.05 level the propensity for the ADF test to reject the unit 
root null hypothesis is lowest for the largest December 1994 asset size band (i). This 
propensity increases (and is therefore inversely related to asset size) over bands (i) to (iii). 
Between bands (iii) to (v) there is little or no relationship between size and the propensity for 
the ADF test to reject. A similar pattern is obtained from the IPS test, which fails to reject the 
null for bands (i) and (ii). For band (iii) the result of the IPS test is borderline, with a p-value 
of 0.0379. For bands (iv) and (v) the null is rejected decisively.16 
Overall, the time-series estimations indicate that Gibrat’s Law, interpreted as a 
descriptor of the dynamics of the size-growth relationship for each credit union individually, 
cannot be rejected for surviving credit unions at the upper end of the asset size distribution. 
For smaller credit unions the pattern is mixed. Gibrat’s Law is rejected as a descriptor of the 
dynamics of the size-growth relationship for all of the smaller credit unions: in some cases 
log assets is stationary in relation to a deterministic time trend. At the 0.05 level, the 
percentage rejection rate of the unit root null among the smaller credit unions is slightly 
below 16% in the ADF tests. With a maximum sample size of T=17, however, the ADF test 
has limited power, suggesting that the true proportion of smaller credit unions departing from 
Gibrat’s Law might be substantially larger than the ADF test rejection rates indicate.   
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Estimation Results: Cross-Sectional Regressions 
Table 8 reports the estimation results for the cross-sectional sample-selection model 
of survivorship and growth. A separate set of equations is reported for growth rates defined 
over yearly intervals (ending in December) for the period 1996 to 2010 inclusive. The 
survivorship regressions include the same set of covariates as the hazard functions reported in 
Section IV with the exception of the age covariate, for which the coefficients were small and 
insignificant in preliminary estimations of the survivorship regressions. A lagged growth 
covariate is included in the cross-sectional survivorship regressions. The latter, which are 
dominated by disappearances owing to M&A, are similar to the M&A hazard function 
reported in Table 5, with a reversal of signs on all coefficients because survival, rather than 
disappearance, is coded one, and disappearance coded zero.  
The coefficients on the size, lagged growth, capitalization and return on assets 
covariates are predominantly positive and significant. The coefficients on the liquidity 
covariate are predominantly negative, and several are significant. These coefficients may be 
interpreted in the same way as the corresponding coefficients in the hazard function 
estimations reported in section III. The coefficients on the loans-to-assets covariate are 
predominantly positive and several are significant prior to the late-2000s financial crisis; but 
several negative coefficients are obtained from t=2007 onwards. The change in sign might be 
linked to the fact that a significant share (around 50% on average) of a credit union’s loan 
book takes the form of ‘first mortgage real estate’ and ‘other real estate’. This aspect of the 
loan book came under significant pressure during the financial crisis of the late-2000s, when 
a low loans-to-assets ratio may have increased the probability of survival. The coefficients on 
the non-performing loans covariate are varied in sign, but predominantly insignificant. The 
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coefficients on the non-interest expenses covariates are predominantly negative and 
significant.   
 The estimates of the correlation coefficient between the stochastic components of the 
survivorship and growth regressions are varied in sign, but negative and significant in the 
estimations that correspond to the economic downturns of the early- and late-2000s. A 
plausible interpretation is that rapid expansion of a financial-service provider’s balance sheet 
correlates negatively with survival during a downturn. 
In the growth regressions, the coefficients on the lagged asset size covariate are all 
positive and significant; and the coefficients on the lagged growth covariate are likewise 
positive and significant. These results are indicative of a pattern of divergence in the size 
distribution, with the larger institutions growing faster on average than their smaller 
counterparts. In the cross-sectional dimension, accordingly, Gibrat’s Law is unequivocally 
rejected. A pattern of positive persistence in growth has tended to increase the pace of 
divergence.  
Differences in product and service mix, product delivery mechanisms and operational 
characteristics of large and small credit unions can help explain the pattern of divergence in 
growth. For example, at the end of 2010 unsecured lending for large credit unions (assets 
greater than $500 million) accounted for 10.8% of all loans; the corresponding figure for 
small credit unions (assets less than $10 million assets) was 21.1%. The average loan size 
was $14,173 for large credit unions, and $5,624 for small credit unions. 84.2% of large credit 
unions provided business loans, while only 7.0% of small credit unions did so. Technological 
capability in service delivery was size-dependent: 100% of large credit unions provided web-
based home banking, while only 48% of small credit unions did so. Large credit unions used 
0.26 full-time equivalent employees per million of assets; the corresponding figure for small 
credit unions was 0.45.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This study examines the impact of exit and internally-generated growth on the firm-
size distribution of the US credit union sector for the period 1994-2010. This period 
represents the most recent stage of a longer-term phase of consolidation that has seen the 
number of credit unions reduced from a peak of 23,866 in 1969 to 7,334 in 2010.  
The econometric analysis reported in this study comprises a panel estimation of 
hazard functions for the determinants of exit through acquisition or failure, and two sets of 
time-series and cross-sectional regressions for the relationship between asset size and 
internally-generated growth. The cross-sectional estimations include a control for 
survivorship bias. The empirical hazard functions indicate that smaller credit unions are at 
greater risk than larger ones of disappearance through either acquisition or failure. After 
controlling for asset size older credit unions are at higher risk of acquisition, but the failure 
probability is not age-dependent. The empirical relationship between capitalization and the 
probability of acquisition is negative as anticipated, but highly capitalized credit unions 
appear to be at higher risk of failure. This latter pattern might be driven by a size effect 
(smaller institutions are more highly capitalized on average, and at higher risk of failure); or 
it might reflect balance-sheet adjustments on the part of distressed credit unions shortly prior 
to liquidation. Credit unions holding a high proportion of their assets in liquid form, and 
credit unions with low loans-to assets ratios, are at higher risk of exit through acquisition or 
failure. While consolidation through M&A has had a large impact on the size of the credit 
union population, the impact of consolidation on concentration is modest, owing to the 
majority of the acquired credit unions having been small in terms of asset size. 
Consistent with the trend in the population size distribution and concentration 
revealed in descriptive tabulations, the growth regressions are indicative of a pattern of 
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divergence in the population size distribution that is highly consistent over time, with the 
larger institutions having grown faster, on average, than their smaller counterparts. 
Interpreted as a descriptor of the dynamics of the size-growth relationship for each credit 
union individually, Gibrat’s Law accurately describes the growth of credit unions at the upper 
end of the asset size distribution, but is rejected in favour of a stationary alternative for many 
smaller credit unions. Interpreted as a descriptor of the cross-sectional size-growth 
relationship, Gibrat’s Law is unequivocally rejected. The inclusion of a control for 
survivorship bias in the cross-sectional growth regressions suggests that rapid expansion of a 
credit union’s balance sheet correlates negatively with survival during an economic 
downturn. Divergence in the average rate of internally-generated growth between the smaller 
and larger institutions is identified as the principal factor driving the observed increase in 
concentration.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 According to the World Bank Financial Structure database (2010), the five-firm concentration ratio 
(CR5) for the US banking industry was 21% in 2003 and 37% in 2009; for the UK: 86% (1993) and 
88% (2009); for France: 46% (1993) and 52% (2009); for Germany: 50% (1993) and 77% (2009); and 
for Japan: 30% (1993) and 65% (2009). 
2 According to Sutton (1997) Caves (1998) and Coad (2009), Gibrat’s Law provides an accurate 
representation of the actual size distribution of firms in many industries. Empirical tests of Gibrat’s 
Law have produced mixed results. A number of early studies, based on data up to and including the 
1970s, report either no relationship or a positive relationship between firm size and growth. Several 
recent studies find a consistent tendency for small firms to grow faster than large firms. 
3 Worldwide, more than 50,000 credit unions operate in 100 countries, with a combined membership 
of 188 million and assets under control of $1,460bn (World Council of Credit Unions, 2011). The 
credit union operating and business model is relatively homogeneous across countries. The US credit 
union movement is among the most developed in the world, and the US experience offers insights for 
cooperative movements in financial services worldwide. 
4 During the 1990s and 2000s financial deregulation also eased many of the constraints on the 
business activities of US banks, increasing competition as barriers to entry into local or state banking 
markets were reduced or eliminated. An increasingly dominant group of large banks, operating a 
high-volume low-cost retail banking model, pursued aggressive growth strategies, including M&A on 
a large scale. Although similar trends towards deregulation and consolidation have been operative for 
banks and credit unions alike, analogies should be drawn cautiously in view of the difference between 
the profit and non-profit orientation of the two types of institution. 
5 Neither banks nor credit unions face restrictions on the prices they charge for specific products. 
Credit unions, however, face some restrictions on their volumes of small-business lending, while 
banks are subject to limits on lending concentration. 
6 Several studies examine the impact of credit union M&A on financial performance (Fried et al., 
1999; Ralston et al., 2001; Bauer et al., 2009; Mcalevey et al., 2010; Wilcox and Dopico, 2011). 
7  With the exception of some securities investments, credit unions were originally distinguished from 
other financial institutions by their emphasis on small value, unsecured, non-mortgage loans to 
individuals and households. Federal credit unions gained the authority to make long-term (up to 30 
years) mortgage real estate loans in 1977. At the end of 2010, first mortgages accounted for 39.3% of 
all loans, and second mortgages accounted for 7.6%. The 1994 figures were 21.3% and 5.5%, 
respectively. Other changes to the typical product mix of credit unions include growth in the 
importance of credit-card lending. Around 53% of credit unions offered credit cards in 2010 (CUNA, 
2010). Unsecured lending accounted for only 10.8% of all credit union lending in 2010, down from 
20.3% in 1994. 
8 For discussion of the background to CUMAA, see Frame et al. (2002). CUMAA also introduced a 
capital regulation system of net worth requirements and prompt corrective action, which came into 
force in 2000. Congressional hearings were held in 2005 to examine the tax-exempt status of credit 
unions, justified by its proponents as a policy tool to tackle financial exclusion. Tax-reform 
proponents argue that credit unions should be subject to corporate taxation (US Government 
Accountability Office, 2005). Following the 2005 hearings the tax-exempt status of credit unions was 
retained, despite intense lobbying by banks for its abolition.  
9 Corporate credit unions provide services for (retail) credit unions, including deposit of excess funds, 
payment services and access to liquid funds if required. 
10 In addition the NCUA has approved a new rule requiring credit union directors to receive financial 
literacy training, and opened a new office of Consumer Protection.   
11 An analysis of churning in the rankings of US credit unions at the top end of the asset size 
distribution also reflects a high level of stability in the size distribution. The same two credit unions, 
Navy Federal and State Employees, occupied the top two positions throughout this period; and seven 
of the ten largest credit unions in December 1995 also featured among the ten largest in December 
2010. 
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12 The CUMAA specifies mandatory actions for credit unions that do not meet capital adequacy 
standards. These include: annual earnings retentions of at least 0.4% of total assets; the submission 
and adherence to a net worth restoration plan (NWRP); lending restrictions; and the prohibition of 
increases in assets until net worth is restored. The CUMAA allows the NCUA to use 14 supervisory 
actions to supplement the mandatory actions. 
13 The case 1,i>0, in which growth tends to increase with size, is usually disregarded because it 
implies unstable or explosive growth. The possibility that large firms tend to grow more rapidly than 
small firms can accommodated, however, through suitable variation over i in the trend coefficients 3,i 
(in the case 1,i<0, where log size is stationary relative to a deterministic time trend), or the drift 
coefficients 0,i (in the case 1,i=3,i=0, where log size is non-stationary).   
14 For the observation following an acquisition that took place between t–1 and t, the acquirer’s 
‘synthetic’ growth rate is si,t–
*
1t,is  , where 
*
1t,is   is the logarithm of the sum of the assets of the 
acquirer and the acquired as separate entities at t–1, and the lagged ‘synthetic’ growth is 
*
2t,i
*
1t,i ss   , 
with 
*
2t,is   defined in the same manner at t–2. Where the acquisition took place between t–1 and t–2, 
the lagged ‘synthetic’ growth is 
*
2t,i1t,i ss   .  
15 An inverse empirical size-growth relationship may be a manifestation of survivorship bias. Small 
firms are less likely to survive than large firms, but fast-growing small firms are likelier to survive 
than slow-growing ones. As a consequence, studies using samples of firms that survive over the entire 
period of the analysis are subject to a form of survivorship bias, because firms that failed to achieve 
rapid growth and exited would not have been recorded. 
16 The power of the IPS test is dependent on the number of panel constituents. However, the observed 
pattern of rejection and non-rejection is not a feature of variation in the power of this test. A similar 
pattern is obtained if the cohort is subdivided into equal-sized quintiles based on June 1994 assets 
(with each quintile containing either 1,449 or 1,450 credit unions). The IPS test fails to reject the null 
for the largest assets-size quintile (p-value=.7447); but the IPS test rejects the null for each of the four 
smaller size quintiles (p-value=.0000 in each case). 
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TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Trends in the size distribution of the population of US credit unions, 1994-2010,  
and projections, 2011-2015 
 
 Number of credit unions by asset size class Total 
number  1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A: Actual       
Dec 94 3805 2919 2586 1657 1085 12052 
Dec 95 3648 2812 2506 1661 1120 11747 
Dec 96 3429 2715 2473 1656 1170 11443 
Dec 97 3275 2638 2442 1669 1222 11246 
Dec 98 3047 2522 2438 1690 1295 10992 
Dec 99 2784 2415 2395 1705 1329 10628 
Dec 00 2659 2314 2300 1700 1342 10315 
Dec 01 2370 2111 2317 1731 1454 9983 
Dec 02 2147 1955 2305 1738 1542 9687 
Dec 03 1938 1832 2256 1764 1578 9368 
Dec 04 1788 1777 2143 1713 1594 9015 
Dec 05 1732 1705 2061 1614 1580 8692 
Dec 06 1671 1656 1919 1570 1544 8360 
Dec 07 1602 1584 1850 1516 1545 8097 
Dec 08 1458 1475 1801 1503 1563 7800 
Dec 09 1308 1351 1729 1494 1666 7548 
Dec 10 1221 1281 1707 1466 1660 7335 
Panel B: Projected       
Dec 11 1141 1216 1683 1436 1653 7132 
Dec 12 1066 1154 1657 1413 1646 6938 
Dec 13 997 1097 1630 1388 1639 6752 
Dec 14 933 1044 1602 1364 1631 6574 
Dec 15 874 993 1574 1341 1623 6404 
 
Note: Asset size classes are defined in real terms, measured in 1994 prices, as follows. class 1, assets below 
$2m; class 2, assets between $2m and $6m; class 3, assets between $6m and $18m; class 4, assets between 
$18m and $54m; class 5, assets above $54m. All price conversions are based on the US GDP deflator.  
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TABLE 2 
Yearly rates of transition between asset size classes, 1994-2010 
 
Size 
class, t 
Size 
class, t+1 
Year, t 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 2 .911 .916 .922 .908 .914 .909 .854 .869 .886 .906 .875 .883 .905 .886 .868 .899 
 3 .026 .035 .039 .058 .043 .022 .106 .085 .054 .020 .014 .014 .023 .046 .091 .038 
1 1 .922 .915 .934 .917 .898 .919 .881 .890 .883 .893 .902 .902 .922 .893 .884 .910 
 2 .016 .024 .025 .033 .022 .014 .046 .041 .038 .016 .010 .010 .010 .023 .037 .023 
 Exit .062 .061 .041 .050 .081 .067 .073 .070 .079 .091 .088 .088 .069 .083 .079 .067 
2 1 .043 .026 .021 .014 .015 .036 .008 .015 .015 .030 .064 .059 .035 .016 .010 .019 
 2 .911 .916 .922 .908 .914 .909 .854 .869 .886 .906 .875 .883 .905 .886 .868 .899 
 3 .026 .035 .039 .058 .043 .022 .106 .085 .054 .020 .014 .014 .023 .046 .091 .038 
 Exit .020 .023 .018 .019 .029 .032 .032 .031 .045 .044 .048 .045 .037 .051 .031 .042 
3 2 .035 .020 .020 .009 .018 .033 .005 .011 .007 .039 .062 .065 .036 .018 .009 .021 
 3 .924 .940 .937 .931 .930 .922 .899 .914 .927 .917 .899 .891 .919 .919 .881 .937 
 4 .033 .029 .036 .050 .037 .025 .079 .055 .047 .018 .014 .012 .020 .039 .084 .027 
 Exit .007 .011 .007 .011 .014 .020 .017 .021 .019 .027 .026 .032 .025 .023 .026 .016 
4 3 .024 .011 .010 .005 .011 .021 .003 .005 .007 .022 .065 .036 .031 .016 .006 .023 
 4 .947 .952 .952 .936 .951 .955 .911 .930 .949 .940 .905 .932 .929 .933 .888 .934 
 5 .026 .033 .034 .051 .031 .018 .074 .054 .031 .024 .018 .017 .023 .030 .083 .024 
 Exit .004 .004 .004 .008 .007 .006 .012 .011 .012 .013 .013 .014 .018 .020 .023 .019 
5 4 .006 .003 .004 .004 .006 .009 .001 .001 .003 .008 .021 .025 .013 .009 .004 .014 
 5 .993 .995 .995 .989 .985 .987 .990 .994 .988 .983 .972 .959 .977 .981 .985 .975 
 Exit .002 .003 .001 .007 .008 .003 .010 .004 .008 .009 .006 .016 .010 .010 .010 .011 
 
Note: Asset size classes are defined in real terms, measured in 1994 prices, as follows. class 1, assets below $2m; class 2, assets between $2m and $6m; class 3, assets 
between $6m and $18m; class 4, assets between $18m and $54m; class 5, assets above $54m. All price conversions are based on the US GDP deflator. 
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TABLE 3 
Entrants and exits, 1995-2010 
 
 Entrants Acquisition Purchase & 
Assumption 
Liquidation Conversion 
to bank 
Conversion 
to privately 
insured 
Unclassified 
disappearance 
Total exits Exit rate Number 
live at end 
of year 
1994 - - - - - - - - - 12052 
1995 13 290 5 22 1 0 0 318 .0264 11747 
1996 20 293 11 17 1 1 1 324 .0276 11443 
1997 19 192 4 17 0 3 0 216 .0189 11246 
1998 8 215 5 28 3 11 0 262 .0233 10992 
1999 13 335 11 24 3 4 0 377 .0343 10628 
2000 13 292 13 18 3 0 0 326 .0307 10315 
2001 10 296 8 25 6 2 5 342 .0332 9983 
2002 7 265 7 23 1 4 3 303 .0304 9687 
2003 15 315 5 10 2 2 0 334 .0345 9368 
2004 3 332 6 11 3 0 4 356 .0380 9015 
2005 8 302 1 25 2 0 1 331 .0367 8692 
2006 10 313 2 23 1 0 3 342 .0394 8360 
2007 4 248 2 10 3 0 4 267 .0319 8097 
2008 4 275 1 19 1 1 4 301 .0372 7800 
2009 4 229 1 23 1 2 0 256 .0328 7548 
2010 5 190 7 19 0 0 2 218 .0289 7335 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive statistics: Mean values of key variables, by year 
 
 Si,t Ai,t Ki,t Qi,t Li,t Ni,t Ei,t Ri,t 
Dec 94 24.22 38.82 .127 .0384 .615 .00432 .0200 .0199 
Dec 95 26.29 39.86 .134 .0403 .643 .00436 .0208 .0217 
Dec 96 28.71 40.91 .140 .0377 .651 .00430 .0216 .0211 
Dec 97 31.32 41.88 .145 .0380 .651 .00426 .0223 .0206 
Dec 98 35.42 42.90 .145 .0397 .617 .00429 .0218 .0193 
Dec 99 38.78 43.96 .148 .0994 .625 .00397 .0179 -.0113 
Dec 00 42.55 44.97 .145 .1095 .662 .00387 .0201 .0039 
Dec 01 50.32 46.00 .138 .1573 .600 .00411 .0192 .0022 
Dec 02 57.91 47.03 .135 .1560 .570 .00419 .0188 .0033 
Dec 03 65.55 48.03 .133 .1631 .553 .00408 .0187 .0021 
Dec 04 72.26 49.08 .136 .1410 .564 .00385 .0190 .0020 
Dec 05 78.61 50.20 .143 .1209 .595 .00389 .0198 .0021 
Dec 06 85.53 51.21 .151 .1200 .618 .00310 .0208 .0023 
Dec 07 93.64 52.23 .155 .1287 .613 .00314 .0213 .0021 
Dec 08 104.3 53.36 .151 .1251 .586 .00364 .0208 -.0004 
Dec 09 117.2 54.43 .138 .1410 .552 .00388 .0199 -.0025 
Dec 10 124.6 55.50 .134 .1471 .530 .00402 .0216 -.0002 
 
Note: Variable definitions are as follows: Si,t = Total Assets; Ai,t = Age; Ki,t = capital-to-assets ratio = Net Worth 
/Total Assets; Qi,t = Liquid Assets / Total Assets; Li,t = Loans / Total Assets; Ni,t = Non-performing loans / Total 
Assets; Ei,t = Non-interest Expenses / Total Assets; Ri, t = return on assets = Net Income / Total Assets  
 
 
TABLE 5 
Estimation results: M&A and failure hazard functions 
 
 M&A hazard Failure hazard 
si,t–1 -.3892 
(-47.5) 
-.3733 
(-13.1) 
a i,t–1 .2232 
(6.57) 
-.0689 
(-0.81) 
Ki,t–1 -3.2013 
(-15.8) 
2.1939 
(6.40) 
Qi,t–1 .8537 
(8.26) 
1.4142 
(5.28) 
Li,t–1 .1354 
(1.74) 
-1.2614 
(-4.32) 
Ni,t–1 -.5707 
(2.12) 
1.8707 
(4.40) 
Ei,t–1 1.3732 
(6.38) 
-0.3604 
(-0.83) 
Ri,t–1 -4.5576 
(-20.9) 
-3.5482 
(-5.47) 
No. of observations 311637 311637 
No. of disappearances 4471 341 
log-likelihood -39325.3 -2652.0 
 
Note: Variable definitions are as follows: si,t–1 = logarithm of Total Assets at the six-monthly data-point prior to 
disappearance; ai, t–1 = log Age; Ki, t–1 = capital-to-assets ratio = Net Worth /Total Assets; Qi, t–1 = Liquid Assets / 
Total Assets; Li, t–1 = Loans / Total Assets; Ni, t–1 = Non-performing loans / Total Assets; Ei, t–1 = Non-interest 
Expenses / Total Assets; Ri, t–1 = return on assets = Net Income / Total Assets  
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TABLE 6 
Trends in industry concentration measures, 1994-2010 
 
 Concentration ratios Actual Counterfactual  
(no M&A) 
CR5 CR10 CR20 HHI Numbers 
equivalent 
HHI Numbers 
equivalent 
Dec 94 6.2 8.8 12.2 19.2 520.9 19.2 521.8 
Dec 95 6.1 8.8 12.4 19.2 520.3 19.1 523.9 
Dec 96 6.1 8.8 12.5 19.0 525.9 18.8 530.9 
Dec 97 6.3 8.9 12.8 19.7 506.6 19.5 513.1 
Dec 98 6.5 9.2 13.2 20.5 486.8 20.2 494.3 
Dec 99 6.5 9.4 13.4 20.8 480.9 20.4 489.8 
Dec 00 6.7 9.6 13.8 21.9 457.3 21.4 467.2 
Dec 01 7.0 10.2 14.4 23.9 418.5 23.4 428.2 
Dec 02 7.4 10.7 15.0 25.8 388.2 25.1 397.9 
Dec 03 7.6 10.9 15.2 27.1 368.3 26.4 378.8 
Dec 04 8.1 11.4 15.8 29.7 337.1 28.8 347.3 
Dec 05 8.5 11.9 16.5 31.4 318.2 30.4 328.7 
Dec 06 9.0 12.4 17.3 34.3 291.9 32.9 303.7 
Dec 07 9.9 13.3 18.4 40.1 249.5 38.5 259.7 
Dec 08 10.1 13.7 18.8 41.9 238.6 40.2 248.7 
Dec 09 10.2 13.6 18.4 42.2 237.1 40.3 248.0 
Dec 10 10.8 14.3 19.1 46.5 215.2 43.8 228.5 
 
 
TABLE 7 
Estimation results: Time-series growth regressions 
 
  
 Rank by December 1994 assets size All 
 1-250 251-500 501-1000 1001-2000 2001-7247 
ADF tests: proportion of rejections of the unit root null hypothesis 
   =0.01 .040 .060 .080 .063 .075 .072 
   =0.05 .108 .116 .156 .144 .159 .153 
   =0.1 .196 .172 .220 .218 .230 .225 
IPS panel unit root test 
   Ztbar 5.35 2.26 -1.775 -4.883 -18.005 -16.185 
   p-value 1.0000 .9881 .0379 .0000 .0000 .0000 
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TABLE 8 
 Estimation results: Cross-sectional survivorship and growth regressions 
 
 
t 
Growth regression  
dep. var. = (si,t–si,t–1) 
Survivorship regression 
dep. var. = 1 for credit unions that survived from t–1 to t, 0 for credit unions that disappeared 
 
 
atanh(u) st–1 si,t–1–si,t–2 const. si,t–1 si,t–1–si,t–2 Ki,t–1 Qi,t–1 Li,t–1 Ni,t–1 Ei,t–1 Ri,t–1 const. 
1996 .006*** .253*** -.060*** .195*** 1.71*** 1.27*** -.272 .421** 3.58* -7.10*** -.746 -1.01*** .031 
 (12.0) (29.4) (-8.17) (10.2) (7.59) (3.18) (-0.66) (2.55) (1.78) (-3.82) (-0.35) (-3.09) (1.13) 
1997 .009*** .282*** -.125*** .133*** 2.26*** -.109 -.516 .187 1.09 -5.32** 4.18 .129 -.008 
 (17.9) (27.4) (-15.1) (6.08) (7.47) (-0.26) (-1.03) (0.90) (0.55) (-2.33) (1.50) (0.34) (-0.18) 
1998 .011*** .256*** -.113*** .131*** 1.56*** .139 -.502 .229 -.911 -4.74** 4.63* -.025 .022 
 (21.5) (29.3) (-14.7) (6.54) (5.95) (0.35) (-1.10) (1.19) (-0.40) (-2.31) (1.86) (-0.07) (0.72) 
1999 .002*** .243*** -.013* .144*** 2.59*** 1.15*** -1.58*** .549*** .674 -5.00** 5.04** -.769** -.047 
 (4.38) (24.2) (-1.66) (7.89) (9.53) (3.31) (-4.10) (3.13) (0.32) (-2.52) (2.12) (-2.46) (-1.11) 
2000 .011*** .120*** -.155*** .191*** 2.65*** 1.88*** .085 .176 -2.29 -5.89*** 5.29*** -1.20*** -.033 
 (19.2) (12.3) (-17.4) (10.1) (9.48) (5.05) (0.40) (1.14) (-1.32) (-4.09) (8.80) (-3.94) (-0.39) 
2001 .011*** .164*** -.079*** .129*** 1.34*** .587 -.420** .529*** -2.16 -9.74*** 8.58*** -.122 -.097** 
 (20.5) (15.7) (-9.20) (7.13) (6.46) (1.57) (-2.12) (3.46) (-0.98) (-6.35) (6.34) (-0.38) (-2.25) 
2002 .004*** .236*** -.025*** .106*** 2.47*** 1.52*** -.514*** .130 12.8*** -2.47 19.48*** -.098 -.253*** 
 (8.38) (24.2) (-2.96) (5.20) (8.31) (3.45) (-2.70) (0.73) (4.52) (-1.32) (10.0) (-0.28) (-5.26) 
2003 .008*** .295*** -.091*** .114*** 1.76*** 1.18*** -.322* .791*** -2.86 -5.39*** 10.65*** -.373 -.273*** 
 (15.1) (29.2) (-10.6) (5.58) (6.44) (2.88) (-1.87) (4.51) (-1.46) (-3.26) (6.53) (-1.11) (-3.73) 
2004 .007*** .242*** -.117*** .153*** 1.06*** 1.14*** -.230 .293* -1.69 -6.33*** 10.80*** -.684** -.062 
 (16.0) (25.8) (-15.4) (8.43) (3.95) (2.81) (-1.34) (1.81) (-0.69) (-4.42) (6.97) (-2.13) (-1.37) 
2005 .012*** .280*** -.203*** .149*** 2.16*** 1.90*** -.426** .110 2.68 -5.50*** 13.14*** -.575* .060 
 (22.6) (26.9) (-24.1) (7.81) (7.11) (4.33) (-2.26) (0.66) (0.98) (-3.56) (7.03) (-1.68) (1.26) 
2006 .009*** .271*** -.163*** .087*** 1.85*** .514 -.104 .774*** -.321 -7.07*** 10.41*** .218 -.070 
 (17.9) (24.7) (-18.8) (4.74) (6.66) (1.32) (-0.50) (5.00) (-0.12) (-4.86) (7.91) (0.66) (-1.01) 
2007 .007*** .279*** -.108*** .073*** 2.43*** .355 -.190 -.217 -9.74*** -4.38*** 15.88*** 1.08*** -.052 
 (15.7) (26.7) (-13.7) (3.51) (7.31) (0.80) (-0.71) (-1.22) (-2.94) (-4.17) (9.28) (2.74) (-1.04) 
2008 .009*** .056*** -.095*** .124*** 2.14*** 2.01*** -.723*** .075 -2.81 -1.97* 15.57*** -.346 -.117*** 
 (15.4) (8.52) (-10.4) (6.22) (6.12) (4.56) (-3.05) (0.46) (-0.86) (-1.93) (9.61) (-0.94) (-3.44) 
2009 .009*** .275*** -.085*** .126*** 1.46*** 1.51*** -.436* -.089 17.49*** 3.26*** 19.98*** -.434 -.358*** 
 (13.0) (21.9) (-7.63) (5.95) (5.07) (3.24) (-1.67) (-0.50) (5.35) (4.73) (12.0) (-1.12) (-6.30) 
2010 .001** .146*** -.008 .009 2.37*** 1.69*** -.873*** -.176 0.845 .147 17.92*** 1.71*** -.692*** 
 (2.26) (12.1) (-0.80) (0.41) (6.80) (3.63) (-3.48) (-0.86) (0.42) (0.13) (11.6) (4.17) (-13.5) 
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Note: Variable definitions are as follows: si,t–1 = logarithm of Total Assets at the data point at the start of the two-year interval over which growth is measured; (si,t–si,t–1) = 
logarithmic growth in assets from t–1 to t; (si,t–1–si,t–2) = logarithmic growth in assets from t–1 to t–2; Ki, t–1 = capital-to-assets ratio = Net Worth /Total Assets; Qi, t–1 = Liquid 
Assets / Total Assets; Li, t–1 = Loans / Total Assets; Ni, t–1 = Non-performing loans / Total Assets; Ei, t–1 = Non-interest Expenses / Total Assets, Ri, t–1 = return on assets = Net 
Income / Total Assets 
 
 
 
